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THE MEDIEVAL REVIVAL
OF ROMAN LAW:
IMPLICATIONS FOR
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL
EDUCATION
HENRY MATHER*
Legal systems have often borrowed laws or ideas from other
legal systems.1 For example, Solon's laws for Athens in the sixth
century B.C. were influenced by the legal codes of other Greek
city states. Much of the English Statute of Frauds of 1677 was
copied from the French Ordonnance de Moulins. The 1960 Civil
Code of South Korea borrowed extensively from German law.
Perhaps the most momentous borrowing occurred when
European lawyers transplanted into medieval society the ancient
Roman law contained in Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis.
This article deals with the medieval revival of Roman law.
Part I provides a brief historical survey of the revival. Part II
attempts to identify some of the factors that made the revival
successful in the sense that it brought about vast improvements
in the law. Part III suggests that these same factors can help us
improve our American law, but only if we make substantial
reforms in legal education.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MEDIEVAL REVIVAL OF
ROMAN LAW IN WESTERN EUROPE
Our historical sketch focuses on the period from the middle
Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law.
J.D. with distinction, Cornell University School of Law (1970). M.A., Columbia
University (1961). B.A. with distinction, University of Rochester (1959).
Author, CONTRACT LAW AND MORALITY (1999).
1 Alan Watson has suggested that "borrowing has been the most important
factor in the evolution of Western law in most states at most times." ALAN
WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF WESTERN PRIVATE LAW 193 (expanded ed. 2001).
"[T]o an enormous extent law develops by borrowing from another place and
even from another time." Id. at 263.
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of the eleventh century to the end of the fourteenth century.
A. Law in the Mid-Eleventh Century
In the mid-eleventh century, Europe had no written,
organized, and comprehensive legal system. Law was largely a
matter of social custom, which is mainly unwritten.2 Even the
written law codes were primitive. They consisted largely of
penalties for various forms of violence and contained little
contract, commercial, or property law.
Good examples are found in the written codes promulgated
by various Lombard kings from 643 to 755 A.D. and still in effect
in mid-eleventh century Italy.3 The code issued by King Rothair
(or Rothari) in 643 A.D. contains 388 titles. Titles 1 through 152
and titles 277 through 358 prescribe in gory detail penalties for
offenses we would characterize as crimes or torts. Title 48, for
example, sets the penalty for gouging out a freeman's eye, while
title 50 prescribes a different penalty for cutting off a freeman's
lip.4 The penalty for cutting off a freeman's index finger (title
64) is sixteen solidi, whereas the penalty for cutting off a
freeman's middle finger (title 65) is only five solidi.5 Rothair's
code contains no contract or commercial law except for titles 245
through 252, which deal with the pledge of collateral for a debt
(what we would call a possessory security interest). A creditor
could not take a pledge of collateral until he had three times
demanded payment and had not been paid.6 This is not the kind
of law that stimulates secured lending. The Laws of King
Grimwald (668 A.D.) contain no contract or commercial law. The
2 See MANLIO BELLOMO, THE COMMON LEGAL PAST OF EUROPE 1000-1800, at
41 (Lydia G. Cochrane trans., The Catholic Univ. of Am., 1995) (pointing out
that the written barbarian laws recorded only a small part of the customs).
3 The Germanic Lombards had entered Italy in 568 A.D. and by the middle
of the eighth century had captured all of northern Italy from the Byzantines. In
774 A.D. the Lombard Kingdom was conquered by the Franks under
Charlemagne, but the Lombard codes remained in effect. They were
supplemented by some new Frankish laws and subsequently supplemented by
laws of the German Emperors who controlled most of Italy from the tenth
century.
4 See Rothair's Edict in THE LOMBARD LAWS 61-62 (Katherine Fischer
Drew trans., The Univ. of Pa. Press, 1973).
5 See id. at 63-64.
6 See id. at 101.
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Laws of King Liutprand (713-35 A.D.) contain 153 titles; of
these, twelve deal with pledges of collateral, 7 and only three deal
with other commercial matters.8 The Laws of King Ratchis (745,
746 A.D.) contain fourteen titles; two of these titles provide
evidentiary rules concerning pledges and sales.9 The Laws of
King Aistulf (750, 755 A.D.) contain no contract or commercial
law.
Throughout Western Europe in the eleventh century, many
people were governed by written law codes issued by Germanic
rulers, but based on ancient Roman law. Some of these codes
were a bit more sophisticated than the Lombard codes. In the
Germanic kingdoms that replaced the Western Roman Empire in
the fifth century, Roman law survived to some extent and was
incorporated into written codes; however, what survived was a
small part of the legal system developed by the ancient Romans,
and even that small part was retained in a crude and simplified
form. Historians thus refer to it as "vulgar Roman law."
A good example of vulgar Roman law is the Lex Romana
Visigothorum (or "Breviarium") promulgated in 506 A.D. by
Alaric II, King of the Visigoths. This code was probably intended
only for the Visigoths' Roman subjects but may have been
applied to Visigoths as well. Either way, the code governed a
vast majority of the people in Visigothic territory, as the
Visigoths were far outnumbered by the Romans. The
Breviarium was based largely on the Roman Theodosian Code, a
collection, completed in 438 A.D., of imperial laws issued since
the time of Constantine and concerned to a large extent with
matters of imperial government rather than private law such as
contract or commercial law. The Breviarium also included some
writings of the Roman jurist and legal scholar Paul, and an
abridgment of Gaius' Institutes, a hornbook for Roman law
students. Therefore, the Breviarium was an abridgment of an
abridgment. Peter Stein suggests that the Breviarium became
the main source of Roman law in Western Europe from the sixth
century to the eleventh. 10
7 See Laws of King Liutprand, titles 15, 36-41, 58, 67, 108, 109, 128, in
THE LOMBARD LAWS at 150-51, 162-63, 168, 172-73, 191, 200.
8 See id., titles 16, 57, 79, at 151, 167-68, 178.
9 See Laws of King Ratchis, titles 5, 8, in THE LOMBARD LAWS at 219, 221.
10 See PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 32 (English ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999).
325
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The Germanic codes, including those based on vulgar Roman
law, were primitive, partly because they were compiled by
lawmakers who had little legal learning, and partly because
these lawmakers had very limited aims. They assumed that the
purposes of law were merely to prevent violence and enforce
customary social practices.
B. Some New Questions
By the twelfth century, assumptions about the purposes of
law had changed profoundly. A new class of intellectuals began
to think that new social practices could be developed, practices
that would not only prevent violence, but also give ordinary men
and women the opportunity to live truly good lives in a secular
world outside the monasteries. These new intellectuals began to
ask three questions: Philosophically, what kind of human can
live a good life in this world? Educationally, what kind of
education does he need? Jurisprudentially, what kind of laws
does he need?1' Because these were the questions asked, the
major innovations of the "Renaissance of the Twelfth Century"
tended to be in the fields of philosophy, education, and law.12
The third inquiry, regarding the kind of law that was
needed, was easily answered. Medieval polities needed law
written in Latin and comprehensive enough to regulate all the
various aspects of societies that were becoming increasingly
complex. A special need existed for law that could facilitate
contractual exchange and thus promote a commercial revolution,
already underway, that promised to enhance the material basis
11 For similar observations on important questions, see ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 170-71 (2d ed. 1984).
12 The so-called "Renaissance of the Twelfth Century" really began in the
late eleventh century. This renaissance should not be confused with the later
renaissance of the fifteenth century, which (aside from the field of art) was not
nearly as significant. "If one should want to specify in what age Western
Christian civilization took on its definitive form, its configuration, one should
have to decide upon the twelfth century. The twelfth century was a creative
and formative age without equal." JOHAN HUIZINGA, MEN AND IDEAS: HISTORY,
THE MIDDLE AGES, THE RENAISSANCE 179 (James S. Holmes & Hans van Marle
trans., Meridian Books 4th prtg. 1966). According to Norman Cantor, the
intellectuals of the twelfth century tried to apply intelligence to the problems of
society and improve society. "The most outstanding instance of this
development is the transformation of European law during the twelfth
century." NoRMAN F. CANTOR, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 306 (.
1993).
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of a good life.13 And because the good life required the exercise of
moral virtue, medieval societies needed law that enforced the
virtues of good faith and fair dealing in private transactions.
C. Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis
One and only one existing body of law could meet these
needs. Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis was the obvious choice
for the wholesale legal borrowing that was necessary, since there
was neither enough time nor enough legal imagination to
construct complete legal systems from the ground up. The
Corpus Juris Civilis is a vast compilation of ancient Roman legal
materials, arranged and somewhat modified by a group of
Byzantine professors and lawyers appointed by Emperor
Justinian. Work on the Corpus Juris began in 528 A.D. and was
largely completed by 534 A.D.. The Corpus Juris thus provided
a picture of Roman law as seen through a Greek lens many years
after the demise of the Western Roman Empire. The most
important part of the Corpus Juris is the Digest, which contains
scholarly commentary by Roman jurists and supplies the most
detailed explication of Roman private law. Most of this
commentary comes from the period 100-250 A.D. and presents
various and often conflicting positions on each legal issue. The
Corpus Juris also contains: the Institutes, a hornbook for
students based partly on Gaius' Institutes; the Code, which
includes imperial statutes and other pronouncements of Roman
emperors; and the Novels, which added imperial
pronouncements issued after the publication of the Code.
In 554 A.D., after Justinian took Italy from the Ostrogoths,
he put his Corpus Juris into force as the law of Italy. After the
Lombards ousted the Byzantines, parts of the Corpus Juris were
still used, but the Digest disappeared.
Fortunately, the Digest was rediscovered in Italy in the late
eleventh century; Justinian's complete Corpus Juris was now
available to European lawmakers, and it met their most
important needs. It contained the world's most detailed and
comprehensive private law written in Latin. It provided a
13 Charles Homer Haskins noted that especially in northern Italy, the new
commerce demanded a law more flexible and commerce oriented than Lombard
rural custom. See CHARLES HOMER HASKINS, THE RENAISSANCE OF THE TWELFTH
CENTURY 207 (Meridian Books 1957) (1927).
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relatively sophisticated body of contract law and enforced the
moral virtues of good faith and fair dealing.
An examination of Roman contract law reveals some serious
defects, but also indicates why contract law has been the most
highly regarded part of Roman law.14 The Romans had no
general theory of contract. To be enforceable, an agreement had
to fit squarely within one of a few contract types. 15  The
stipulatio was an oral contract formed when party A asked party
B whether he would promise to do something and B immediately
responded that he did so promise. 16 Stipulatio could be used to
promise anything not prohibited by law.'7 However, it had
limited usefulness for commercial exchange contracts. In the
first place, the promise had to be made in a face-to-face meeting
of the parties, not in a letter delivered to a distant party.'8
Secondly, it was difficult and cumbersome to use stipulatio for
bilateral exchange contracts. Each party had to make a very
detailed stipulation, not only stating all of his duties, but also
stating how those duties were conditional upon the other party's
performance. 19
Each of the four "real" contracts were formed informally but
only when one party had delivered some tangible property to the
other. Of these real contracts, only pignus (pledge) had
commercial importance. A debtor transferred possession of
property to his creditor as collateral security for the debt. If the
debtor paid the debt, the creditor was obligated to return the
pledged property. If the debt was not paid, the creditor could sell
the collateral, but was obligated to pay the debtor any surplus of
the sale proceeds over the amount of indebtedness. 20 The three
14 Alan Watson suggests that Roman law has been the most copied system
in the West and contract law the most admired part of that system. See
WATSON, supra note 1, at 33.
15 The advantages and disadvantages of this "forms of action" approach are
nicely summarized in BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 165-
66 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1975) (1962).
16 See FRITZ SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 473 (1951).
17 See id. at 479.
18 See NICHOLAS, supra note 15, at 193; ALAN WATSON, THE SPIRIT OF
ROMAN LAW 133 (1995).
19 See WATSON, supra note 18, at 133.
20 See SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 521. But the creditor could claim
reimbursement for his expenses incurred in disposing of the collateral. See id.
So the net result was remarkably similar to that dictated by our American
Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. §§ 9-615(a), (d) (2001).
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other real contracts involved gratuitous transactions, usually
between friends.21
In Roman contract law, the four "consensual" contracts were
emptio venditio (sale), locatio conductio (hire), societas
(partnership), and mandatum (mandate). Unlike the stipulatio,
the consensual contracts required mutual consent but no
particular formal expression.22 Unlike the real contracts, the
consensual contracts could be purely executory, with no prior
delivery.23  In all consensual contracts, both parties were
obligated to act in good faith in every aspect of the transaction. 24
There could be no duress, fraudulent misrepresentation, or even
fraudulent nondisclosure. 25 The mandate contract was formed if
A gratuitously promised B, usually a friend of A's, to execute a
commission given to him by B.26 This contract was not useful in
commerce because A's performance of the commission was
gratuitous and not for a reward, and because A lacked any
agency power to create binding contracts between B and third
parties. 27  Nor was the societas partnership contract
commercially useful. Among other things, a partner lacked the
agency power to bind his partners to contracts he formed with
third parties, 28 and the partners owed each other only a
21 Mutuum (loan for consumption) was a loan of "money or other fungible
things"; the borrower merely had to return an equal quantity of like things and
did not have to pay interest unless he made a separate stipulatio to that effect.
See NICHOLAS, supra note 15, at 167-68; SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 508-10. In
commodatum (loan for use), the borrower had to return the very thing he
borrowed, but paid nothing for the use of that thing. See id. at 508, 513.
Depositum (deposit) was used when one party entrusted property to the other
party for safekeeping (not use) and did not pay a fee. See NICHOLAS, supra note
15, at 168; SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 517-18; WATSON, supra note 1, at 39.
22 See NICHOLAS, supra note 15, at 171; SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 524.
23 See NICHOLAS, supra note 15, at 171; SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 524.
24 See NICHOLAS, supra note 15, at 163, 171; SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 525.
25 Thus, in the sale contract, a seller acted in bad faith if he knew of a
defect in the thing he was selling, knew that the buyer was not aware of the
defect, and failed to tell the buyer about the defect. See NICHOLAS, supra note
15, at 176, 181; PETER STEIN, THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN
CIVIL LAW: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 28 (1988).
26 See NICHOLAS, supra note 15, at 187; SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 554;
WATSON, supra note 18, at 44.
27 See SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 555 (pointing out that the party carrying
out the commission was not the direct agent of the party at whose request he
was acting).
28 See NICHOLAS, supra note 15, at 187; SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 551.
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minimum of obligations. 29
The emptio venditio (sale) was used for sales of specific goods
or real property in exchange for a money price and was a
contract of great commercial importance.30  The contract
included an implied warranty by the seller that the buyer would
have quiet enjoyment of the thing being purchased (that the
buyer would not be evicted by someone with a better title).31
Various implied warranties by the seller also existed to protect
the buyer in the event of latent qualitative defects in the thing
being purchased. 32 Protection against mistakes in contracting
was provided by a complicated set of rules that made a sales
contract unenforceable if there was some "fundamental" mistake.
Fundamental mistakes included mutual misunderstanding
concerning the specific thing to be sold and mutual mistake
about the materials with which the thing was made, but it was
not always clear which other mistakes counted as fundamental. 33
Like the contract for sale, locatio conductio (hire) was
commercially useful. It was a versatile contract that could be
used for leases of goods or real estate, service contracts, and
virtually any bilateral agreement involving a money price, so
long as it was not a sale. 34
D. The Law School at Bologna
Justinian's Corpus Juris, with its complex body of contract
law, could not be used to improve European legal systems until it
was understood. This long process of understanding began in
earnest when a man called Irnerius began teaching the entire
Corpus Juris at Bologna near the end of the eleventh century.
Although Irnerius was merely a private teacher and not an
employee of any educational institution, he soon began to attract
29 See SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 553 (suggesting that the Roman societas
was excessively individualistic and therefore did not serve as a model for
modern commercial partnerships).
30 See NICHOLAS, supra note 15, at 171-74.
31 See SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 534; WATSON, supra note 18, at 41.
32 See NICHOLAS, supra note 15, at 181-82; SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 535-
39; WATSON, supra note 18, at 41.
33 See generally NICHOLAS, supra note 15, at 176-78; SCHULZ, supra note
16, at 528-29.
34 See NICHOLAS, supra note 15, at 182-85; SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 542-
43, 544; WATSON, supra note 18, at 43.
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students from all over Europe.
In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the private law
schools of Irnerius and his early successors at Bologna were
transformed into an institutionalized law school that was the
leading center of legal studies in Europe. The leadership of
Bologna was due in large part to the fact that it taught
Justinian's Corpus Juris, with increasing emphasis on the
Digest, the part of the Corpus Juris that was the most fruitful
source of legal ideas.
The institutionalized law school at Bologna had one
especially interesting feature. Until it was taken over by the city
in the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century, the University
of Bologna was a student corporation, an amalgamation of
student guilds, that controlled the professors. Each time a
professor was late for class or ended class before the closing bell,
the students fined him. If he did not cover all the material in the
syllabus by the end of the term, he was again fined by the
students.35
By the end of the twelfth century, the law school at Bologna
taught both Roman law and canon law and had an enrollment of
at least 1000 students.36 Yet the school taught little, if any,
royal law, municipal law, customary law, or other primary
source of local positive law. What the school taught was legal
method and an ideal law (Roman law and canon law) containing
general principles that could be applied to any area of law in any
part of Europe. Apparently, the students flocked to Bologna
because they knew what they needed in order to participate in
the development of new legal systems back home. There is thus
justification for Hastings Rashdall's claim that in many respects,
the work of the law school at Bologna "represents the most
35 A number of justifications can be offered for student control. (1) Most of
the students were not Bolognese citizens, but foreigners who lacked civil rights
and needed protection. (2) Most of the students were mature adults who had
already obtained bachelor degrees and had begun careers in the Church, in
government, or in business. (3) Many of the students were wealthy. (4) If the
students were unhappy, they might leave Bologna, and the professors and
other citizens of the city would lose a lot of income. See HAROLD J. BERMAN,
LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 124-
25 (1983).
36 Harold Berman notes that some modern estimates of typical enrollments
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries range as high as 10,000. See id. at 124,
124 n.3.
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brilliant achievement of the intellect of medieval Europe."37
The Bolognese model was copied by new law schools that
sprang up in the twelfth century (Modena, Pisa, and Montpelier,
for example) and thirteenth century (notably Naples, Toulouse,
Orleans, and Salamanca). Like Bologna, these new schools
taught Roman law and canon law but deemphasized or ignored
local law.
E. Glossators, Commentators, and Canonists
From the early twelfth century to the middle of the
thirteenth century, legal scholarship was dominated by the
"Glossators," Irnerius and the teacher-scholars who succeeded
him at Bologna. In addition to Irnerius, some of the most
important Glossators were Bulgarus, Martinus, Bassianus,
Placentinus, Azo, and Accursius. The Glossators focused on
mastering the text of Justinian's Corpus Juris, an important
first step that had to be taken before the Corpus Juris could be
successfully used by medieval lawmakers. The Glossators
intensively studied and explained each fragment in the text,
interpreting difficult passages, providing cross-references to
other fragments dealing with the same issue, identifying
conflicts between different fragments, and trying to reconcile
such conflicts. All of this was done in glosses (annotations)
written between the lines of a Corpus Juris manuscript or in its
margins or, when no space was left in the manuscript book, on
separate pieces of paper.38
From the late thirteenth century to the end of the fifteenth
century, the most important legal scholars were the
"Commentators" (or "Post-Glossators"), a group who taught at
various law schools, not just Bologna, and included influential
scholars such as Cinus de Pistoia, Bartolus de Saxoferrato, and
Baldus de Ubaldis. The Commentators wrote broad and
systematic commentaries that attempted to apply Roman law to
the needs of medieval society in a practical way. They thus took
37 1 HASTINGS RASHDALL, THE UNIVERSITIES OF EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES
254 (2d ed. 1936).
38 The Glossators also wrote treatises in which they attempted to
systematize one or more large portions of the Corpus Juris. Their more specific
glosses seem to have been their more important work, however. See NICHOLAS,
supra note 15, at 46-47.
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a significant step beyond the work of the Glossators, who had
chiefly been concerned with understanding and explicating
Roman law. The Commentators studied customary, feudal,
royal, and municipal law and were aware of the gaps in these
systems. Many of these gap issues also had not been addressed
in Justinian's Corpus Juris. The Commentators therefore
derived general principles from the Corpus Juris, canon law, and
the works of natural law philosophers such as Aristotle and
Thomas Aquinas, and then used these principles to suggest how
the gaps in contemporary positive law should be filled in order to
make European legal systems not only more complete but also
more equitable. The major achievement of the Commentators
was showing how Roman law, canon law, and moral philosophy
could be used to improve European legal systems.
The accomplishments of the canonists were as significant as
the work of the Glossators and Commentators. In medieval
Europe, canon law was important because the Church courts
asserted a wide jurisdiction over matters we now regard as
secular. This jurisdiction extended to marriage and the other
sacraments, and to anything closely related to sin or the welfare
of human souls; it thus included marriage, the termination of
marriage, the legitimacy of offspring, the validity of
testamentary wills, contracts made under oath or requiring good
faith, usury, the manipulation of commercial markets,
defamation, perjury, homicide, theft, sexual misconduct, and the
lawful times and conditions of work. In the late eleventh
century, Popes Gregory VII and Urban II had issued many new
canons in their attempt to reform the Western Church, and by
1100 A.D. canon law consisted of a greatly enlarged but
disorganized and unsystematic mass of materials taken from the
Bible, works of the early Church Fathers, canons enacted by
Church councils, and papal decretals (letters announcing papal
decisions on actual cases). The needed systematization was
provided by Gratian, a monk who taught canon law at the
monastery of San Felice in Bologna. About 1140 A.D., he
published his Concordance of Discordant Canons, which became
known as the "Decretum" and was the first truly scholarly study
of canon law. In this work, Gratian reorganized the canonical
authorities and added his own comments, many of which were
drawn from Roman law. He also noted apparent conflicts in the
authorities and used a dialectical method in trying to reconcile
41 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 4
them. Gratian's Decretum served as the basic guide to canon law
for many centuries.39
After the middle of the twelfth century, canon law scholars
and Roman law scholars worked in close cooperation.40 Canon
law was strongly influenced by Roman law. The procedural rules
for ecclesiastical courts were based in large part on Justinian's
Corpus Juris. The canonist concept of marriage as a consensual
union, based on mutual affection and respect, came from Roman
law. 41 Canonist doctrine concerning mistake as a ground for
nullifying marriage was partly borrowed from Roman doctrines
of mistake in contracts of sale.4 2 Canon law also allowed
nullification of marriage contracts made under duress, and the
test for duress (consent induced by fear that a "constant" man
would not overcome) was taken from Justinian's Digest.43 In
turn, Roman law scholars borrowed ideas from the canon law.
For example, canon law was the major inspiration for the
gradually successful attempts by the Glossators and
Commentators to liberalize Roman law so that contracts could be
enforced even when they did not fit within any of the contract
39 Rashdall exuberantly summarized the impact of Gratian's book: "The
Decretum is one of those great text-books which, appearing just at the right
time and in the right place, take the world by storm." RASHDALL, supra note 37,
at 127. After the time of Gratian, various collections of new canons (mostly
papal decretals) were published. The most important of these collections were
the Liber Extra (1243 A.D.), the Liber Sextus (1298 A.D.), the Clementinae
(1317 A.D.), the Extravagantes Johannis XXII (1325-27 A.D.), and the
Extravagantes Communes (1503 A.D.). In 1582 A.D., the aforementioned
collections, along with Gratian's Decretum, were synthesized and printed as the
official body of Roman Catholic canon law. They had this official status until
the twentieth century.
40 Cooperation was facilitated by the fact that many canonists and many
Romanists had studied both Roman law and canon law in law school and
obtained joint degrees. James Brundage suggests that law students who hoped
to make a good living as practicing lawyers needed to study both bodies of law.
See JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAw 60, 96-97 (1995). This need
may have arisen because secular judges often borrowed procedural or
substantive doctrines from the canon law and ecclesiastical judges were likely
to adopt Roman law doctrines. See id. at 97.
41 See MARCIA L. COLISH, MEDIEVAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE WESTERN
INTELLECTUAL TRADITION 400-1400, at 285 (1997).
42 See R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE LAW
65-66, 66 n.72 (1992).
43 See BRUNDAGE, supra note 40, at 166-67, 166 nn.44-46 (citing the Liber
Extra and Justinian's Digest and pointing out the similarity of the "constant"
man and the "reasonable" man of the Anglo-American common law).
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types recognized by classical Roman law. 44
F. Spread of the Ius Commune
By the fourteenth century, the combination of Roman law
and canon law had become known as the ius commune and had
spread throughout a good part of Western Europe. The reception
of the ius commune was, of course, facilitated by the fact that it
was written in Latin, the common language of educated
Europeans. Equally important was the legal education of the
men who filled new positions as judges, advocates, and
assistants to secular and ecclesiastical rulers; most of these new
legal professionals had been trained in law schools that
concentrated on Roman and canon law. The ius commune was
thus the law that the new lawmakers knew best.
Canon law had an easy victory. It was the primary source of
law in Church courts throughout all of Catholic Europe,
including the British Isles. The spread of the new Roman law
based on Justinian's Corpus Juris was slower, and the pace
varied from one region to another. The new Roman law was
quickly received in Italy, the southern part of France, and the
Iberian peninsula. 45 In the northern part of France, customary
law continued to prevail, but by the thirteenth century, Roman
law had become an important supplement. 46 In the German
principalities of the Holy Roman Empire, Roman law was not
received to any great extent until the late fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries. But when it occurred, the reception was
massive.47 In Scotland, Roman law was established as the
primary gap filler in the sixteenth century. However, Roman law
never really took hold in the English royal courts (except for the
44 See RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-
MATERIALS 272 (5th ed. 1988).
41 In the Spanish Christian kingdoms, Roman law co-existed with a large
amount of written customary law.
46 Philippe de Beaumanoir's treatise on the Customs of Beauvaisis (about
1280) showed the influence of both Roman law and canon law; it drew heavily
on the Roman law of contracts because customary contract law was not highly
developed. For further information about de Beaumanoir's work (and northern
France generally), see BELLOMO, supra note 2, at 101-05; STEIN, supra note 10,
at 66.
47 See STEIN, supra note 10, at 88-92. In 1495, Roman law and canon law
officially became mandatory law in the Reichs-kammergericht, the highest
court of the Holy Roman Empire.
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chancery and admiralty courts).48
We must remember that nowhere in late medieval Europe
were Roman law and canon law the only kinds of law being used.
In each geographical region, there were a number of legal
systems, each with its own law and its own courts: canon law,
feudal law, manorial law, royal law, municipal law, and the law
merchant. 49  And everywhere, social custom was still a
recognized source of law. The primary role of the ius commune
was to fill the huge gaps in the local legal systems. Roman law
and canon law were also used in interpreting existing local law,
and provided standards by which courts determined whether a
local custom was unreasonable and thus legally invalid. In these
ways the ius commune gradually shaped the legal systems that
ruled most of Western Europe until they were replaced by the
massive codifications of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
II. REASONS FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE REVIVAL
Why was the medieval revival of Roman law successful in
the sense that it substantially enhanced the quantity and quality
of law in Western Europe? The following summary will provide
a partial answer to our question and will focus on factors that
have important implications for contemporary legal education.
The medieval revival of Roman law involved a massive
transplant into medieval societies of a legal system that had
been developed in ancient times before the fall of the Western
Roman Empire. We will therefore begin by identifying some
48 Beginning with the reign of Henry 11 (1154-89 A.D.), the Angevin Kings
of England and their royal courts rapidly developed a common law based on
case law precedent and feudal custom. Members of the ruling class were not
interested in a Roman law which would have altered their precious feudal
relationships. For explanations of how Roman law differed from feudal law, see
BERMAN, supra note 35, at 453-54; VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 42, at 80-81;
WATSON, supra note 1, at 243-45. And from the reign of Edward I (1272-1307
A.D.), advocates in the royal courts were trained in the Inns of Court (which
were anti-Roman), rather than in the universities where Roman law was
taught. This effectively sealed the fate of Roman law in England.
49 The law merchant was developed by the merchants themselves and
designed primarily for commercial transactions between merchants of different
nationality. Although the law merchant was more suitable than Roman law for
such transactions, it was not generally used for noncommercial contracts or
contracts between a consumer and a nearby merchant. There was thus a need
for a new general law of contracts. Medieval lawmakers filled this void by
resurrecting Roman contract law and then modifying it.
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factors that are essential for the success of any legal
transplanting or "borrowing" enterprise.
For borrowing to even occur, lawmakers who work within
one legal system must be aware of and receptive to legal ideas
and intellectual concepts that come from outside that system
(factor 1). The external ideas and concepts might be found in the
contemporary legal system of a foreign country. They might be
found in the legal history, the legal past, of the borrowing system
itself. They might be found in some non-legal discipline such as
philosophy, economics, or sociology. Whatever their source, these
external ideas and concepts must be studied and understood
before they can be truly borrowed and not caricatured (factor 2).
If the enterprise of borrowing is to succeed in improving the
borrowers' legal system, some additional factors are required.
The ideas being borrowed will probably have to be modified
somewhat if they are to fit the borrowing legal system and its
social and cultural context. The borrowers will thus have to
perform a critical analysis of the external ideas, identify their
strengths and weaknesses and eliminate, or at least mitigate,
the weaknesses (factor 3). In order to determine what is a
strength or weakness in the external ideas, the borrowers must
consider contemporary social and economic circumstances in
their own society (factor 4). They must also ask whether a
particular external idea would promote the purposes or goals of
their own legal system (factor 5).
Finally, legal education will have to be structured so that
future generations of lawyers working within the borrowing legal
system will be able to use the newly borrowed ideas - and ideas
that may be suitable for future borrowing - in ways that
improve that legal system (factor 6). Law schools must therefore
train their students to do all the things involved in factors 1
through 5.
In the remainder of Part II, we will see that each of the
factors necessary for a successful legal transplant was present in
the medieval revival of Roman law. Indeed, all six factors were
present to a high degree.
A. Receptive Awareness of Legal History and Comparative Law
(Factor 1)
Factor 1 in our list of requirements for successful borrowing
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is a receptive awareness of ideas that come from outside the
legal system that is to engage in borrowing. The medieval
revival began with an awareness of legal history. With the
rediscovery of Justinian's Digest in the late eleventh century, the
entire Corpus Juris became available to legal scholars. Almost
immediately, Irnerius and his Glossator successors at Bologna
made their students and other law professors aware of
Justinian's compilation of ancient Roman law, a body of law that
had been developed more than eight centuries earlier, and after
the fall of the Western Roman Empire had been applied only in
"vulgar" and mutilated form.50
Medieval lawyers not only borrowed materials from a
historically prior legal system, they also engaged in what we
would call comparative law, the study of contemporary legal
developments in other countries and other legal systems. Law
professors and lawmakers throughout Europe borrowed ideas
from Italian Commentators, such as Bartolus de Saxoferrato and
Baldus de Ubaldis. The Italian Commentator, Cinus de Pistoia,
was heavily influenced by the French legal scholars, Jacques de
R6vigny and Pierre de Belleperche. We have already seen that
secular courts and professors of Roman law borrowed ideas from
canon lawyers, who in turn derived much of their canon law from
Justinian's Corpus Juris.
B. Receptive Awareness of Other Disciplines: Teleological
Natural Law Philosophy (Factors 1 and 5)
Factor 1 in our list of requirements for successful borrowing
can be satisfied by a receptive awareness of ideas found in non-
legal disciplines. Medieval lawyers were in touch with other
disciplines and borrowed ideas from them, especially from
philosophy. Lawyers were particularly interested in moral and
political philosophy, and here the most influential tradition was
natural law theory.
Medieval notions of natural law were drawn from Cicero,
50 In looking back to ancient Roman law, medieval lawyers were acting in
the sprit of their own time. The "Twelfth Century Renaissance" was, to a large
extent, an attempt to recover the cultural treasures of ancient Greece and
Rome and give them new life. This renaissance (which actually began in the
eleventh century and continued past the twelfth) involved the revival of
classical philosophy, law, literature, and art.
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Justinian's Digest, Aristotle, and Aquinas. 51 A key idea found in
all of these sources is that human conduct should be regulated
by norms that are both derived by means of rational reason and
consistent with human nature.52 Although natural law theory is
rationalistic, it is also aware of both the potentialities and
limitations of the human animal. This rational but not unduly
optimistic approach produced helpful answers to all three of the
questions posed by twelfth century intellectuals: What kind of
human can live a good life in this world? What kind of education
does he need? What kind of laws does he need?
Natural law theory provided a teleological answer to the
first question. In natural law teleology, everything is evaluated
according to how well it fulfills its telos, its end or purpose.
Aristotle had said that the natural end of a human being was to
live well, rationally, and virtuously.53 Thus, the kind of human
who can live a good life in this world is a human who lives
rationally and virtuously.
Because the purpose of educational institutions is to enable
people to live good lives, natural law teleology provided an
answer to the second question: humans need education that
teaches them how to live rationally and virtuously.
Natural law theory gave a similar answer to the third
question. Humans need laws that help them live good lives. The
purpose of positive law, according to Aquinas, is to facilitate good
lives for all citizens (the "Common Good").5 4 The law should
51 The development of natural law theory involved a considerable amount
of cross-cultural borrowing. Cicero derived much of his natural law approach
from the Stoics and other Greek schools of philosophy. The popularity of
Aristotle's moral philosophy was partly due to commentaries on Aristotle
written by Islamic thinkers, such as Avicenna and Averroes, and Jewish
writers like Avencebrol and Maimonides. St. Thomas Aquinas produced a
moral and legal philosophy that synthesized Aristotle's Greek philosophy and
Roman natural law theory with the Christian tradition.
52 See, e.g., CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA 3.22.33, at 68 (Niall Rudd trans., 1998)
(asserting that true law is right reason in agreement with nature); ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS, THE TREATISE ON LAW [BEING SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-II, QQ. 90
THROUGH 97)] q. 91, art. 2, corpus, at 159-60 (R.J. Henle ed. and trans., 1993)
(suggesting that natural law is the part of God's eternal law that can be
discerned by human reason).
53 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1098a 7-17, at 17, 1099b 25--26, at
22 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962) (suggesting that a good human life is a life of
rational activity in conformity with virtue).
5 See AQUINAS, supra note 52, at 131-34 (Q 90, art. 2, corpus and
translator's comment noting that the Common Good is the good of all members
of society).
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therefore help people to live rationally and virtuously. Legal
rules and penalties can perform a moral education function that
supplements familial training by teaching citizens to treat others
fairly, without coercion, deceit, or exploitation.55 In suggesting
that the purpose of law was to help people live good lives,
natural law theory provided medieval lawmakers with a
teleological criterion that could be used in evaluating the various
rules of ancient Roman law. Medieval lawmakers were thus able
to satisfy factor 5 in our list of requirements for successful
borrowing: lawmakers in the borrowing system must judge
particular ideas in the borrowed system by asking which of these
ideas would promote the purposes or goals of their own legal
system.
The teleological approach of natural law theory was used not
only to identify the general purposes of law, but to resolve
particular legal issues as well. In the field of contract law, the
obligations of parties to a contract depended on the immediate
end or purpose of the type of contract the parties formed. The
purposes of the marriage contract, for example, were the good of
the offspring and the mutually beneficial association of the two
spouses. Therefore, the contractual duties of the spouses were
determined by these purposes. 56 A second example also involves
contract law. The Commentators Bartolus de Saxoferrato and
Baldus de Ubaldis suggested that, although a sales contract
cannot be avoided for mistake about the "accidental" form of the
thing to be sold, such a contract can be avoided for mistake about
the "substantial" form of the thing, and the substance (or
essence) of a thing may depend on the human purpose it
serves.57
Because the Common Good involves a good life for every citizen, canon lawyers
tried to design laws that would protect the poor and achieve a greater measure
of social equality. Unlike Roman law, which gave poor people harsher sentences
than wealthy people received, canon law afforded equal treatment by the law.
See COLISH, supra note 41, at 327. Canon law even provided that litigants who
could not afford to pay for legal counsel would be given an attorney at the
court's expense. See id.
51 See AQUINAS, supra note 52, at 281-82 (Q. 95, art. 1, corpus and
translator's comment).
56 See JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT
DOCTRINE 14-16 (1991) (explaining the approach developed by Aristotle and
Aquinas).
57 See id. at 57-61. As Gordley notes, the mistake doctrines of Bartolus and
Baldus were not without their own problems. As it turned out, the distinction
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Natural law theory was also influential in the development
of the method by which lawmakers derived legal rules from
general principles. The typical natural law method was to begin
with very general moral principles, derive more specific
principles from them, and finally arrive at rules to be applied to
particular situations. Canon lawyers readily adopted this
method and began searching for general moral principles that
could be applied in all areas of law. Soon, both canon law
scholars and Roman law scholars were busy identifying
significant principles and teaching them to their students.
Some of these general principles were found in book 50 title
17 of Justinian's Digest. They include important principles that
are still applied today: in interpreting testamentary wills, we
should try to carry out the wishes of the testator;58 no one can
change his mind to another person's disadvantage (the estoppel
principle);5 9 nothing is so contrary to consent as force or duress;60
no one should be allowed to profit from his own wrongdoing;61
there is no obligation to do something that is impossible;62 no one
should become richer through another person's loss (the unjust
enrichment principle).63 Digest 50.17 was a favorite subject of
the Glossators and the Commentators, who wrote extensively
between substance and accident did not provide good solutions to mistake
cases. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, American courts were still
wrestling rather unsuccessfully with similar distinctions between substance (or
essence) and quality (or value). Compare A&M Land Dev. Co. v. Miller, 94
N.W.2d 197, 203 (Mich. 1959) (ruling that the fact that the condition of
purchased land was such that the purchaser/developer could not obtain permits
to install septic tanks was not a fact that went to the substance of the land),
with Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (Mich. 1887) (ruling that the fact
that a purchased cow was fertile and not barren was a fact that went to the
substance, the very nature, of the cow). A better approach is to jettison the
Aristotelian metaphysical distinction between substance and accident and
simply ask whether the mistake has a material and adverse effect on a
mistaken party. The American RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS takes
this approach and permits avoidance of the contract because of such a material
and adverse mistake if some other requirements are also met. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (mutual mistake), § 153 (unilateral
mistake) (1981).
58 2 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 50.17.12 (Alan Watson ed. of trans., rev. ed.
1998).
59 Id. 50.17.75.
60 Id. 50.17.116 pr.
61 Id. 50.17.134.1.
62 Id. 50.17.185.
63 Id. 50.17.206.
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about how the Roman principles might be interpreted and
applied in order to improve positive law.
In developing specific legal rules, medieval lawmakers used
general principles flexibly and cautiously. Aquinas wisely
observed that as we work our way down from general principles
toward specific rules, we descend into levels of greater
particularity and contingency, and our reasoning becomes more
fallible, more prone to error.64 For example, goods that have
been deposited for safekeeping should, as a general rule, be
returned. But this rule should not be applied in a case where the
depositor wants his goods back so that he can use them to attack
his own country.65 The canon law regarding usury provides an
example of how medieval lawmakers used general principles
flexibly and recognized the fallibility of legal rules. Canon law
had long held that loaning money at interest was sinful and
illegal. Gradually, canon lawyers realized that lending was
necessary for continued economic expansion, and that lenders
deserved compensation for the opportunity costs they incurred
when they loaned money they could have spent on themselves or
their own businesses. 66 By the end of the medieval period, canon
law allowed lenders to charge interest, so long as it was not
excessive.
The impact of natural law philosophy on medieval law was
profound. Due to natural law theory, lawyers were constantly
aware of the moral purposes of law. They used natural law ideas
when they interpreted Roman law. They used natural law
principles to develop new legal rules that could fill gaps, and to
identify existing rules that were unjust and thus candidates for
elimination or alteration. The contribution of natural law
philosophy is well summarized by Harold Berman:
Natural law was not an ideal law standing outside the
existing legal systems but rather the morality of the law
itself standing within the existing legal systems .... It
was because of the programmatic or political character of
the law, represented particularly by that part of it that
was called natural law, that thousands of young men
went annually to the universities to study law ... in
64 See AQUINAS, supra note 52, at 260-62 (Q. 94, art. 4, corpus); see also id.
at 164 (Q. 91, art. 3, reply 3, noting that human laws are necessarily fallible).
65 See id. at 261.
66 See BERMAN, supra note 35, at 248-50.
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order to prepare themselves for political careers. These
were among the most intelligent and ambitious young
men of Europe. They were taught the positive law and
the techniques of applying it, but they were also taught
the natural law, the law that was to be.
[The impulse for legal growth and reform] was manifested
in the continuity of the legal profession, as successive
generations of lawyers were trained in the universities
and went out into the ecclesiastical and secular
chanceries and courts to practice what they had been
taught.6 7
C. Intensive Study of External Ideas (Factor 2)
External ideas from legal history, comparative legal studies,
or non-legal disciplines must be carefully studied and understood
before they can be usefully borrowed by a legal system. This was
factor 2 in our list of requirements for successful borrowing.
Medieval lawyers undoubtedly devoted much effort to the
study of ancient Roman law, contemporary legal developments in
foreign countries, and natural law philosophy. The study of
Roman law was especially intensive. We noted in Part I that the
Bolognese Glossators who dominated legal scholarship from the
early twelfth century to the middle of the next century were
devoted to mastering each fragment in the text of Justinian's
Corpus Juris. Their study must have been intensive; it was
continuous, not sporadic, and it took about 150 years to
complete.
D. Critical Analysis of External Ideas (Factor 3)
If external ideas are to be successfully borrowed by a legal
system, they must be critically analyzed so that their
weaknesses can be identified and eliminated. This was factor 3
in our list of requirements for successful borrowing (Borrowing is
not successful if it does not improve the borrowing legal system).
Medieval lawyers analyzed Roman law with a critical and
questioning spirit. We will note in section II. F that this spirit
was an important aspect of the "scholastic" method, which
67 Id. at 254.
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dominated medieval intellectual activity. Here, we will merely
mention two examples of this medieval ability to spot
weaknesses in Roman law and correct them. In Part I, we noted
that a weakness in Roman contract law was the lack of a general
theory of contract that could be applied to any type of agreement;
to even be enforceable, an agreement had to fit squarely within
one of a few prescribed contract types. 68 We also noted in Part I
that the medieval Glossators and Commentators, inspired by the
canonists, gradually succeeded in liberalizing Roman law so that
contracts could be enforced even when they did not fit within any
of the ancient Roman types.69 A second example was also
previously noted. In our discussion of natural law philosophy, it
was pointed out that the medieval canonists rejected the Roman
law's harsh and discriminatory treatment of poor people and
tried to ensure that the poor would not be disadvantaged in
Church courts. 7°
E. Awareness of Contemporary Social Circumstances and Needs
(Factor 4)
In order to determine how borrowed ideas should be
modified and adapted to the borrowing legal system, the lawyers
of that legal system must consider contemporary circumstances
and needs in their society. This was factor 4 in our list of
requirements for successful borrowing.
In Part I, we saw that a major concern of the Commentators
was to adapt Roman law to the needs and circumstances of
medieval society.71 We also noted, in our discussion of natural
law theory, that the relaxation of the canon law prohibition of
lending at interest was partly due to a perceived need to
stimulate lending in order to assist economic development. 72
F. Legal Education (Factor 6)
For legal borrowing to be successful, law schools serving the
borrowing legal system must educate their students so as to
68 See supra text accompanying note 15.
69 See supra text accompanying note 44.
70 See supra text accompanying note 54.
71 See supra text following note 38.
72 See supra text accompanying note 66.
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enable future generations of lawyers to use imported ideas in
ways that improve that legal system (factor 6 in our list of
requirements for successful borrowing). The ability of medieval
lawyers to make vast improvements in European legal systems
was due, in large part, to the quality of legal education. The law
schools provided their graduates with the new legal concepts of
Roman law, canon law and, even more importantly, the
intellectual skills and attitudes necessary for socially useful
lawyering.
Entering law students were well prepared. To be admitted
to law school, a person usually had to have a liberal arts degree.
Obtaining a bachelor of arts degree required four to six years of
study. The master of arts degree, a license to teach arts
anywhere in Western Europe, required another two to four
years. The arts curriculum emphasized the "trivium," which
consisted of (Latin) grammar, rhetoric, and logic. 73  Other
courses included the "quadrivium" of arithmetic, geometry,
astronomy, and music, and (by the middle of the thirteenth
century) a healthy dose of Aristotelian moral philosophy. The
beginning law student had thus already been trained to read and
write good Latin, think logically and analytically, and argue
persuasively.
The law school course of study consumed from five to ten
73 Of the trivium subjects, logic (or "dialectic") received the most emphasis.
Liberal arts students read the Aristotelian treatises on logic, but the professors
were innovative and went well beyond Aristotle, especially in semantic theory.
See Norman Kretzmann, Introduction, to THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATER
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM THE REDISCOVERY OF ARISTOTLE TO THE
DISINTEGRATION OF SCHOLASTICISM (1100-1600) 1, 5 (Norman Kretzmann et al.
eds., paperback ed. 1988). Late medieval logic included subjects that today
would be regarded as philosophy of language or metaphysics. Philosophy of
language became an important part of medieval logic because logic evaluates
arguments constructed with words or symbols, and medieval logic lacked our
modern symbols for terms, propositions, and operators; extensive
interpretation of words was therefore necessary. See Klaus Jacobi, Logic (ii):
The Later Twelfth Century, in A HISTORY OF TWELFTH-CENTURY WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY 227, 249 (Peter Dronke ed., paperback ed. 1992). Semantic theories
developed by late medieval logicians were surprisingly sophisticated. Peter
Abelard, for example, tried to explain the difference between what common
nouns name and what they signify; his explanation resembles the distinctions
between reference and sense made by twentieth century Anglo-American
analytic philosophers. See Martin M. Tweedale, Logic (i): From the Late
Eleventh Century to the Time of Abelard, in id. at 196, 217 (discussing Abelard).
Like the training in using Aristotelian syllogisms, the semantic theory was
undoubtedly valuable to pre-law students.
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years, depending on the school and the type of degree being
pursued. A student could obtain a doctorate in civil (Roman) law
in seven or eight years, a bachelor's in five. A bit less time was
required for the degrees in canon law. In ten years, one could
obtain a joint degree in civil law and canon law. The curriculum
was rigidly fixed. Civil law courses covered Justinian's Corpus
Juris; canon law students studied Gratian's Decretum and
subsequent collections of canons. There were no electives. All
students pursuing the same degree took the same courses.
Law school teaching techniques were based on the new
"scholastic method," so called because it was the method of
analysis employed by the schoolmen, the professors in various
institutions of higher learning. This method, used in both
scholarship and teaching, was already rather fully developed in
the twelfth century and made use of both authority and reason.
The analysis began with authoritative texts dealing with a
particular question. A civil law professor might begin with
Justinian's Digest; a theology professor was likely to begin with
Biblical texts. Apparent conflicts would then be identified. In
order to decide whether two textual passages really conflicted,
the schoolmen would interpret each of them, using reason and
hermeneutic techniques that focused on contextual variables
such as time, place, author, and issue. Great efforts were made
to harmonize the texts. If they could not be interpreted as
consistent, the schoolmen might reconcile them by means of a
reasoned distinction. They would suggest, for example, that one
rule should be applied to marriage contracts while a contrary
rule was appropriate for commercial contracts. If the opposing
texts could not be reconciled, schoolmen could either choose one
and reject the other, or reject both of them in favor of a new
synthesis. Any proposed solution of the conflict was proposed
because it seemed the best way to promote human well-being,
given the ultimate purposes of life and contemporary
circumstances and needs. The criteria for identifying the proper
conclusion of the scholastic analysis were thus teleological. 74
74 It seems impossible to identify any one person or discipline as the
originator of scholastic method. Most likely, canon law professors, Roman law
Glossators, and philosopher-theologians all borrowed techniques from each
other and added further refinements. George Makdisi has suggested that
scholastic method may have been imported into Western Europe from Islamic
law schools. See George Makdisi, The Scholastic Method in Medieval
Education: An Inquiry into Its Origins in Law and Theology, 49 SPECULuM 640,
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The spirit of scholastic method was interrogative. Although
the schoolmen tried to harmonize authorities so as to preserve as
much of the existing body of authority as possible, each
authoritative proposition was questioned and open to doubt.
Peter Abelard, one of the early developers of scholastic method,
asserted that "the first key to wisdom is called interrogation,
diligent and unceasing.... By doubting we are led to inquiry;
and from inquiry we perceive the truth."75 Scholastic method
thus involved a ruthless analysis of traditional views. Quoting
authority was not a way to end debate; it was the way to open
debate. 76
Law school teaching exhibited both the form and spirit of
648-60 (1974). Given that so much else in medieval Europe came from Islamic
civilization, Makdisi's thesis is credible. In any event, the works of two late
eleventh century canonists, Ivo of Chartres and Bernold of Constance, exhibit a
fondness for juxtaposing apparently conflicting authorities. In the twelfth
century, scholastic method was elaborated by the logician and theologian Peter
Abelard, then by the canonist Gratian, and then by the theologian Peter
Lombard. Abelard tended to identify conflicts without resolving them. Gratian
and Lombard, however, devoted considerable energy to harmonizing or
distinguishing disparate authorities. In the thirteenth century, Aquinas
further refined scholastic method. For good examples of Aquinas's method, one
might consult AQUINAS, supra note 52. For helpful background on Aquinas's
organizational structure and scholastic method, see the editor's comments in
id. at 8-17.
75 Quoted in 2 HENRY OSBORN TAYLOR, THE MEDIEVAL MIND: A HISTORY OF
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THOUGHT AND EMOTION IN THE MIDDLE AGES 335 (2d ed.
1914). The quotation is taken from the Prologue of Abelard's Sic et Non.
76 See R.W. SOUTHERN, THE MAKING OF THE MIDDLE AGES 207 (1965)
(discussing Peter Lombard's Sentences and the mid-twelfth century climate);
see also COLISH, supra note 41, at 296 (observing that although Aquinas treated
all authorities with respect, whether they were Christian, Jewish, Muslim, or
pagan, he subjected them to critical reasoning and believed that debate should
never be closed off simply by citing authority). Scholastic method, with its
questioning of authority and its attempt to reinterpret authority so as to
promote human well-being, can be regarded as a process of "teleological
reconstruction." Like our contemporary Critical Legal Studies and
deconstruction approaches, it was critical of authority. But, unlike CLS and
deconstruction, it was supposed to reconstruct traditional authority in a better
way, using teleological guidelines. Our contemporary Economic Analysis of Law
and other offspring of classical utilitarianism are like medieval scholastic
method in in that they are both teleological. But Economic Analysis of Law is
concerned only with maximizing aggregate wealth, and contemporary
utilitarianism tends to advocate maximizing the aggregate satisfaction of
citizens' desires. Medieval scholastic method, in contrast, was tied to a natural
law philosophy that saw the good in human life and not mere wealth as the end
to be pursued. It also taught that the satisfaction of some desires does not
contribute to a good life.
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scholastic method. In a morning lecture, the professor would
read a portion of the assigned text, read the interpretive glosses
to that text, try to resolve apparent conflicts, propose
conclusions, note general principles that could be derived from
the text, and raise questions not directly addressed in the text
(for example, how some hypothetical case should be decided). In
an afternoon or evening session, the students and professor
would discuss questions that arose from the morning lecture.
In the twelfth century, the "disputation" developed into an
important educational device. The disputation was like a
modern moot court, except that anyone present was free to argue
and there was no assigned hypothetical fact situation. The
disputation was a debate on a previously announced topic,
usually an important contemporary issue not covered in the
Corpus Juris or canon law. Sometimes the disputation was
merely a classroom exercise, sometimes it was a public event in
which all students and professors of the university were free to
participate. The designated "disputant," who might be a
professor or a student, would begin by stating his position and
would then have to listen to objections raised by the other
persons present and respond to these objections. The
disputation was, like the chivalric tournament, a very
competitive and dangerous game.77
Teaching methods in the medieval law schools helped
students acquire the intellectual skills they would need in order
to be effective counselors and advocates for their clients. Law
students learned to read legal texts carefully, to be aware of
alternative interpretations, to consider all arguments on both
sides of a question, to reason logically, and to argue persuasively.
At the same time, law students acquired intellectual habits
that enabled them to contribute to the improvement of legal
systems. They learned to question everything. They developed a
critical attitude toward existing authority. They learned to
construct general principles that could be used in fashioning new
rules for developing areas of law. And in learning how to
reconcile disparate authorities, they acquired an antidote to
oversimplification and extremism; they learned to appreciate
what is valuable in each opposing theory or proposition and
77 See HUIZINGA, supra note 12, at 189 (observing that the twelfth century
was a time of intense intellectual competition, and comparing the scholastic
disputation to a chivalric tournament).
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construct a synthesis that preserved those valuable elements.
The medieval law students thus learned how subtle and complex
our normative world is. In all these ways, the law schools
enabled their graduates to achieve one of the great goals of
medieval civilization: to improve society by improving the law.78
III. PROPOSALS FOR AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS
Our law schools should prepare students not only for the
practice of law, but also for lawmaking that improves the law.
American lawmakers obtain formal legal training only in law
schools. Many of our legislators and administrative officials, and
all of our judges, are trained in law school. And they are not our
only lawmakers. Practitioners who represent clients before
courts, legislatures, or administrative bodies also help to shape
the law. How well they do this depends to a large extent on their
law school training.
We have seen that the medieval law schools did a number of
things that helped their graduates practice law successfully and
contribute to the improvement of legal systems. The medieval
law schools taught basic intellectual skills: reading texts
carefully, thinking analytically, thinking critically, and arguing
persuasively. They also exposed students to external ideas (from
outside local positive law) that could be borrowed from legal
history, comparative law, and philosophy.
In some respects, our contemporary American law schools
are doing these things better than the medieval law schools did.
In other respects, however, our law schools are not doing as well
as the medieval law schools, and some substantial reforms in
legal education are necessary.
A. Basic Intellectual Skills
Our law students are not devoting enough time to learning
basic intellectual skills. 79 One reason for this is that students
78 Most law school graduates had opportunities to improve the law. Many
of them joined the staffs of secular or Church lawmakers (popes, kings, city
governments, etc.). Some of them became judges. Even those who were merely
advocates for private clients made arguments about what rules should be
applied in court.
79 See Adelle Blackett, Globalization and Its Ambiguities: Implications for
Law School Curricular Reform, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57, 68-69 (1998)
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spend too much time "learning" (memorizing) black-letter rules,
most of which will never be used by the typical student. On most
case law issues, each state's current rule differs somewhat from
the rules used in other states and is also likely to change over
time; the rules presented in the law school casebook for a given
issue (the California rule as of 1985 and the North Carolina rule
as of 1992, for example) are thus unlikely to be the rules that
will govern the student's future clients in Illinois or New Jersey
in the year 2013.80 Basic intellectual skills, on the other hand,
will be useful for practice in any state at any point in time.
1. Law students should learn to read legal texts slowly and
carefully.
Whether reading cases or statutes, whether reading
American law or foreign law, a student should be in the habit of
reading slowly and carefully. She must discern the logical
structure of any legal rule she is reading, noting, for example,
whether the connecting conjunction between rule elements is
"and" or "or." She must take time to consider the alternative
ways in which the rule might be interpreted. She must, of
course, search for statutory, case law, or law dictionary
definitions of key terms in the rule. She should also compare the
textual passage she is reading with other passages dealing with
the same issue. All of this requires great attention to little
details and not just an effort to see "the big picture."
If students are to develop the habit of reading slowly and
carefully, daily assignments in each course must be short,
usually not more than fifteen casebook pages. And the professor
should use socratic questioning in the classroom. This is the
most dramatic (because the most embarrassing) way to make
students realize that they have overlooked a relevant detail.
(suggesting that more emphasis be placed on producing "students who can
think critically, analyze complex material efficiently, articulate their opinions
cogently and persuasively, [and] write forcefully. .. ")
80 Statutory law is a different matter. Many of the statutory rules studied
in law school (rules in the Internal Revenue Code or Uniform Commercial
Code, for example) will be used by a significant number of law school
graduates. But there is no reason why these complex statutory rules should be
memorized by law students. As practicing attorneys, they will (or should) work
with the statutes in front of them and not rely on their memories. Law school
examinations in statutory courses, like exams in case law courses, should
therefore be open-book exams.
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2. Law students should learn to think analytically.
A lawyer cannot successfully practice law or assist in the
lawmaking process unless he can think analytically. Analytical
thinking must at least be logical. But it also involves
classification and the ability to discern whether a particular
concept is a subcategory of another concept or is extrinsic to that
other concept. Analytical thinking also requires a student to
compare two legal rules and identify the differences between
them, so that he can determine which rule he would want a court
to apply if he represented a particular party.
These analytical skills cannot be taught by the lecture
method. They are probably best taught by means of socratic
method and assigned hypothetical problems in which the
students are told which party they represent. In the classroom,
the professor should ask students to predict the outcome under
each of the alternative rules presented in the casebook and select
the rule they would urge the court to apply (the rule that favors
their client).
Legal analysis is too important to leave to the first-year
legal writing course. Every course should be designed to teach
analytical skills. Law schools might also advise their applicants
for admission that pre-law programs should include courses in
logic, mathematics, economics, foreign languages, or other
courses that help students develop analytical abilities.
3. Law students should learn to think critically.
If a law student is to later practice law successfully and
identify elements of positive law that need to be improved, he
must develop a habit of thinking critically. He must habitually
question everything, including judicial decisions and
commentary by casebook editors. He must habitually consider
the arguments on both sides of any issue that arises.
These critical habits are best developed by means of the case
method, which involves classroom discussion of judicial opinions.
Many law students assume that judges are always right.
Critical analysis of judicial opinions will soon show otherwise.
Even in statutory courses, it will be helpful for students to read a
few cases and identify some of the judges' mistakes. Studying
actual cases also enables students to see that typically both
parties have some respectable legal arguments and weighty
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equities in their favor.8'
A professor's lecture cannot teach students to think for
themselves. It will not teach students to think independently
and critically. But socratic questioning can do this. A student
who knows he may be asked to make an argument in class will
be encouraged to spend some time before class developing
arguments on both sides of each important issue presented in
the assigned reading. (This is another reason why assignments
should be short.) In order to further enhance the students'
ability to appreciate arguments on both sides of an issue, socratic
dialogue between professor and student should frequently give
way to open classroom discussion in which all students are free
to express their opinions. One result of such an open disputation
is that each student will hear many diverse viewpoints, most of
which he will respect because they are expressed by classmates
he already knows and respects.
4. Law students should learn how to argue persuasively.
I have suggested that students should be forced to argue in
the classroom. Sometimes a student would have to argue with
the professor. Sometimes a group of students would be told that
they must argue a hypothetical case at the next class meeting.
For example, two students would be assigned to represent the
plaintiff, and two students assigned to represent the defendant,
in a twenty minute moot court or settlement negotiation. By
arguing in the classroom and then being criticized by the
professor and fellow students, a student learns by doing. This is
a hard way, but an effective way, to learn a skill. This is
essentially the way one learns how to play basketball or how to
play the piano.
But classroom argumentation and critique is not enough.
Rhetoric, the art of persuasive communication, involves a
number of principles and techniques that can be taught by
lectures and assigned readings and can accelerate the process of
learning how to argue effectively. The first-year legal writing
course should therefore include a substantial rhetoric
81 See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 113-14 (1993) (suggesting that one of the advantages of the
case method is that students learn to identify the strengths and weaknesses of
each party's argument and come to look "with a friendly eye.. .at... positions
they personally reject. .. ").
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component.
To this point, I have focused on reforms in classroom
teaching methods. I have proposed a priority for intellectual
skills and have emphasized the need for case method and
extensive socratic questioning.8 2  We shall now consider
reforming the law school curriculum.
B. The Need for Jurisprudence, Comparative Law, and Legal
History in the Law School Curriculum
In order to improve contemporary American legal systems,
lawmakers will have to borrow ideas from sources outside their
own legal system. With very few exceptions, lawmakers are not
creative geniuses. Innovative ideas are most likely to come from
foreign legal systems, the legal past, and nonlegal disciplines
such as philosophy.8 3
The successful borrowing of such external ideas will require
a receptive awareness and understanding of the various ideas
that might be borrowed. It will also require critical evaluation of
these ideas, so that lawmakers can identify the ideas that would
82 My impression is that while case method is still used in most law school
courses (where the primary text is usually a casebook, not a treatise), a
majority of professors use socratic method sparingly, if at all. It is difficult to
see how professors might be induced to use socratic method more extensively.
Unfortunately, most law students want to be spoon-fed. Professors who engage
in rigorous socratic questioning tend to be not as popular with students as
professors who lay everything out in well organized lectures that are
supplemented by outlines prepared by the professor and handed out to the
students. Professors who are aware of this tendency and who also fear that
mediocre student evaluations will impair their prospects for promotion and
tenure will be tempted to eschew socratic method and resort to spoon-feeding.
Perhaps we should abolish quantitative student evaluations in which students
give the professor numerical scores that can readily be compared with the
numerical scores of other faculty members. All that is really necessary is an
opportunity for students to comment on things they are competent to judge:
Does the professor come to all the scheduled classes? Is she well prepared for
class? Does she make the students think? Does she encourage the expression of
dissident views?
83 One might ask why a legal system cannot be improved by means of ideas
already contained within that system's intellectual tradition. The answer, I
believe, is that problems and defects - and a perceived need for improvement
- usually appear only when it becomes evident that the internal resources of a
legal system are inadequate for a particular task. If the legal system's internal
resources were adequate, there would be no problem, no defect, and no need for
improving the legal system; there would merely be a need to recognize the
conclusions entailed by the premises already provided by that system.
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improve our legal systems. This evaluation must be made with
an eye toward the proper purposes of law and an awareness of
our contemporary social and economic circumstances. We have
seen that medieval lawyers met these same requirements with
considerable skill and good judgment.
In one respect, improving contemporary American legal
systems is a less daunting task than that which confronted the
medieval Europeans. Our state and federal legal systems are
already highly developed. At the dawn of the twelfth century, on
the other hand, European legal systems were quite primitive,
and European lawmakers were virtually starting from scratch.
In another respect, however, our task is more difficult.
Medieval lawyers knew exactly where to look for external ideas
that could be borrowed. There were only two readily accessible
sources: ancient Roman law and natural law philosophy. But
contemporary American lawyers have a great variety of external
sources at hand. Our world offers many different highly
developed legal systems, we have over 2000 years of extensively
recorded legal history to look at, and there are numerous
philosophical traditions competing with the natural law theories
that dominated medieval Europe. The challenge to our law
schools is formidable. They must somehow produce lawyers who
can understand and evaluate these various sources of ideas that
might be borrowed for the improvement of our law.
1. Jurisprudence should be a required course.
Jurisprudence should be a required part of the law school
curriculum. A course in normative jurisprudence (which
emphasizes moral and political philosophy and asks what the
law should be) offers many different theories of justice that can
provide moral foundations for law. These moral foundations act
as guidelines for lawmakers. They offer criteria that can be used
in deciding which aspects of our law are unjust and need to be
changed, and can also be used in deciding what shape new law
should take.
Students in a jurisprudence course will be exposed to some
philosophical approaches with which they were previously
unfamiliar. They will also acquire some sympathy for
approaches they had previously dismissed out of hand. If the
professor is open minded and gives the students plenty of time
for open debate, most students will come to realize that each
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philosophical approach contributes some good insights but is not
without defects. Students will eventually acknowledge that an
Aristotelian natural law approach might be best for one legal
issue, while a Rawlsian liberal approach could be appropriate for
another issue and a utilitarian approach preferable for a third
issue.
Whether the lawyer is involved in lawmaking or merely
assisting clients, an important part of her work is advising
people about ends and not just means.84 One of the great
advantages of a jurisprudence course is that it forces students to
think about ends, about ultimate goals. What should be
regarded as the proper goals or purposes of our legal system?
Good lives for our citizens? Happy lives for our citizens?
Maximum individual liberty? Maximum economic efficiency?
Only a jurisprudence course can deal in depth with such
questions and thus produce lawyers who are equipped to
evaluate our present legal systems and identify external ideas
that can be borrowed from foreign legal systems or the legal past
and contribute to the improvement of our law. (An external idea
that would frustrate the proper purposes of our legal system will
not improve our law and should not be borrowed.) 85
2. Comparative law should be a required course.
All law students should be required to take a course in
comparative law. Such a course exposes students to the diverse
ways in which foreign legal systems approach legal problems.
The student soon senses that the American approach may not
always be the best approach. The study of comparative law thus
facilitates law reform by encouraging our students to take a
critical attitude toward American law.8 6
84 See KRONMAN, supra note 81, at 15 (asserting that the ideal lawyer
"offer[s] advice about ends"); id. at 53-56 (suggesting that the lawyer-
statesman must deliberate about both means and ends and make judgments
about the relative importance of competing ends).
85 1 am not suggesting that a jurisprudence course will enable lawyers to
perceive the truth about the proper purposes of law. I am merely arguing that a
jurisprudence course will enable lawyers to make more sophisticated
judgments about the proper purposes of law.
86 See George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46
AM. J. COMP. L. 683, 694-95 (1998) (asserting that comparative law affords a
unique opportunity "to generate critical, [and] subversive" reflection about
American law); see also KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 21 (3d rev. ed. 1998) (pointing out that "[clomparative law
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Whenever the need for law reform is recognized, foreign
legal systems are obvious sources of external ideas that might be
borrowed in order to improve our own legal system.8 7 The study
of comparative law will make students more aware of these
foreign sources. It should also result in a better understanding
of these sources.
An additional reason for requiring the study of comparative
law is that foreign law will often be applied to the international
transactions of American clients. And even in international
transactions in which international law or American law is
applied, a foreign party will tend to interpret such law through
the lens of her own legal system. Studying comparative law will
not make our law school graduates experts in foreign law, but it
should help them to identify some of the issues on which foreign
law is apt to be very different from American law.
Some experts in comparative law suggest that the subject is
best taught in a separate course.88  Others assert that
comparative law is best taught by being integrated into our
courses on American law.8 9 We should do both.90
We should not rely solely on a separate course, because one
course is not sufficient to get students into the habit of viewing
American law with a critical eye and looking for alternatives in
offers the law student a whole new dimension," furthers the student's
understanding of her nation's laws, and develops critical standards that help to
improve the law).
87 Zweigert and Kotz note that the different legal systems of the world can
offer a greater variety of solutions to social problems than could be imagined by
a lawyer whose perspective is limited to his own legal system. See ZWEIGERT &
KOTZ, supra note 86, at 15. European lawmakers are aware of this and
routinely survey relevant foreign law before presenting bills to legislatures. See
id. at 16-17; see also RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW:
CASES-TEXT-MATERIALS 9-10 (5th ed. 1988). Although lawyers seeking to
reform the law of a particular state in the United States can find alternative
solutions in the laws of sister states, these solutions are unlikely to be as
numerous and diverse as the solutions offered by the laws of foreign nations.
88 See, e.g., Rudolf B. Schlesinger, The Role of the "Basic Course" in the
Teaching of Foreign and Comparative Law, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 616, 616-17
(1971).
89 See ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra note 86, at 23-24; James Gordley,
Comparative Law and Legal Education, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1003, 1005-08 (2001);
Roscoe Pound, The Place of Comparative Law in the American Law School
Curriculum, 8 TUL. L. REV. 161, 167-68 (1934).
90 See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Dealing in Difference: Comparative Law's
Potential for Broadening Legal Perspectives, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 658, 661
(1998).
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foreign law. Such a habit develops slowly and only with
reinforcement in a number of courses. Ideally, every course in
the curriculum should assist in this habituation. In each of our
courses, the professor should take a comparative approach to at
least a few selected issues, comparing American approaches with
a variety of foreign approaches.
But we also need a separate required course in comparative
law. Unfortunately, we cannot rely on most professors to
voluntarily integrate international comparative method into
their courses on American law. We can therefore conclude that
comparative law should be integrated into other courses and also
taught as a separate course. Similar conclusions seem
appropriate for jurisprudence and legal history.
3. Legal history should be a required course.
Legal history can be a fruitful source of ideas that might be
borrowed in order to improve our contemporary law. We have
seen that the extensive borrowing of ancient Roman law was a
major factor in the success of medieval efforts to construct new
legal systems. Today, American lawmakers have plentiful
opportunities to borrow legal rules, principles, or institutions
from the legal past. Although our historical borrowing will not
be as extensive as the medieval borrowing of Roman law, it can
be beneficial.
The fact that some legal rule or other idea was once in use
but is no longer in use does not mean that it would be
inappropriate today. There may have been good reasons why
Alabama or Austria discarded the idea in some past century, but
those reasons may not be relevant in our contemporary society,
and the idea may once again be useful.
The study of legal history will not only provide some ideas
suitable for borrowing, it will also enable students to better
understand the pathology of legal change. Not every change in
the law is an improvement. Some efforts at law reform turned
out to be detrimental to society. The reforming lawmakers may
have overlooked some social circumstances that prevented the
new law from achieving its intended purpose or goal. Or the new
law may have achieved its intended purpose but frustrated
other, more important, social goals that the lawmakers ignored
or undervalued. The study of legal history can help us
understand why some past law reform programs went wrong and
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thus alert us to mistakes that should be avoided in the future.
Similarly, the study of past law reform movements that proved
successful can help us see what we must do if our own efforts at
improving the law are to be beneficial. 91
We should conclude that legal history ought to be a required
law school course. But what should the course cover? American
legal history? English legal history? European legal history?
Islamic legal history? Chinese legal history? Some combination
of these subjects? It probably does not matter how we answer
the question. An extended survey of the legal history of any
society or culture is likely to serve the educational purposes of a
legal history course. The content of such a course must largely
depend on the qualifications and interests of the professor who
teaches the course. If faculty resources permit, two or three
professors could each teach a different legal history course, and
each law student would be required to choose one of them.
C. A Proposal for Curricular Reform
A majority of American law schools now offer at least one
course in jurisprudence, a majority offer at least one course in
comparative law, and a majority offer at least one course in legal
history. Of the 184 law schools that paid fees to the Association
of American Law Schools in academic year 2000-2001, however,
twenty-five schools did not offer any jurisprudence course, fifty-
one schools did not offer any course in comparative law, and
sixty-four schools did not offer legal history.92 Furthermore, only
ninety schools (less than half) offered courses in all three areas.
The statistics are even worse with respect to the number of
law schools requiring students to take these courses. Of the 181
91 Whether a particular change in the law of some society was an
improvement (a benefit to that society) may be a controversial issue. A law
student can best resolve the issue in her own mind by applying some
jurisprudential notions of the kind of society a legal system should promote.
Whether she is evaluating a segment of the legal past or evaluating some
aspect of a contemporary foreign legal system, the student needs the kind of
philosophical and prescriptive criteria that can be obtained from a course in
jurisprudence. Law students should therefore study jurisprudence before
taking courses in legal history or comparative law.
92 My statistics are based on information contained in THE AALS
DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 2000-2001 (2000). For each subject, I consulted
the List of Law Teachers by Subject (id. at 1133-90) and noted the number of
schools represented.
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American law schools approved by the American Bar Association
as of 2000, only eight required jurisprudence, only one required
comparative law, and only two required legal history.93 No
school required all three courses.
I suggested above that law students be required to take each
of these courses. It will be objected that there is not enough
room in the curriculum for required courses in jurisprudence,
comparative law, and legal history, and that such courses are
luxuries which, if offered, need not be required. I hope that this
article has shown why these courses should be required and not
merely elective. The following proposed curriculum indicates
that there is sufficient room in the curriculum for required
courses in jurisprudence, comparative law, and legal history.
The law student would take fewer elective courses than at
present, but could still take enough electives to obtain a well
rounded legal education.
Figure 1. Proposed Law School Curriculum
93 Statistics for law school degree requirements are based on information
contained in BARRON'S GUIDE TO LAW SCHOOLS (14th ed. 2000).
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Fall Semester Hours Spring Semester Hours
First Civil Procedure 3 Civil Procedure 3
Year I
Property 3 Property 3
Torts 3 Torts 3
Contracts 3 Contracts 3
Legal Researsh 394 Legal Research 3
& Writing & Writing
Second Constitutional Law 495 Criminal Law 3
Year
Business 396 Trusts 3
Organizations & Estates
Legal Accounting or 297 Income Tax 3
Elective
Conflict of Laws 398 Commercial Law 399
Jurisprudence 3 Legal History 3100
Third Comparative Law 3 Evidence 3
Year
Clinical Course or 3101 Elective or 3
Elective Clinical Course
Elective 3 Elective 3
Elective 3 Elective 3
Elective 3 Elective 3
94 Our entering law students are not as well grounded as medieval
students in the trivium of grammar, logic, and rhetoric. The Legal Writing and
Research course is therefore vitally important. It should cover legal reasoning,
legal writing and oral advocacy (with an emphasis on rhetoric), legal research,
and legal citation form.
95 Constitutional Law would be a one semester course, but it would be a
four hour course, and constitutional limitations on criminal procedure would be
covered in the Criminal Law course (which would deal with substantive,jurisprudential, and procedural aspects of criminal law).
96 Business Organizations would cover agency and partnership law as well
as corporate law. It would also provide a brief introduction to securities
regulation.
97 Legal Accounting would be a required course for law students who had
no pre-law course in accounting. Practice in most areas of law often involves
accounting problems. Law school graduates should at least know how to read a
balance sheet and an income statement. Students who had a pre-law course in
accounting could take an elective in place of Legal Accounting.
98 Conflict of Laws should have become a required course long ago. Many
clients will be involved in interstate or international transactions, and their
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Elective courses should include administrative law,
admiralty, antitrust law, securities regulation, law and
economics, payment systems, secured transactions, bankruptcy
law, employment law, environmental law, family law, estate and
gift tax, corporate tax, public international law, international
business transactions, and trial advocacy. Each student would
be able to take seven, eight, or nine of these sixteen elective
courses. The number of electives would depend on whether the
student takes Legal Accounting and whether he takes a clinical
course.
CONCLUSION
The medieval revival of ancient Roman law led to a vast
improvement in the legal systems of Western Europe. What had
been rather primitive bodies of law were transformed into
modern. and comprehensive systems, enlightened in their moral
foundations and sophisticated in their practical details. In large
part, this transformation was due to the skill with which
medieval lawyers made careful and critical studies of ideas
borrowed from legal history, comparative law, and philosophy.
This skill was achieved by means of the curricular structure and
teaching methods of the medieval law schools.
If American lawyers are to make significant contributions to
the improvement of our own legal systems, our legal education
must be reformed. American law schools should devote more
attention to the teaching of certain intellectual skills: reading
texts carefully, thinking analytically, thinking critically, and
arguing persuasively. This will require the retention of the case
lawyers should have some awareness of how courts handle choice-of-law
problems.
99 Commercial Law would provide an overview of the Uniform Commercial
Code and cover important issues in sales, payment systems, and secured
transactions. For a more intensive study of one or more of these areas, students
could take elective courses.
100 Ideally, a student would fulfill the requirement by choosing one of a
number of legal history courses. However, faculty resources may not be
sufficient to provide more than one or two such courses.
101 Ideally, every student should be required to take one clinical course in
the third year, in either the fall or spring semester. If faculty resources do not
permit this, students who cannot take a clinical course would take an extra
elective course.
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method and the reinvigoration of socratic method. Furthermore,
every law school curriculum should include jurisprudence,
comparative law, and legal history as required courses. This will
entail a more rigidly structured curriculum with a shorter menu
of electives. These reforms could help American lawyers develop
the same skills and attitudes that enabled the medieval lawyers
to work their wondrous feats of making law better.
